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A model of English auction that allows jump bidding is proposed. When two
objects are sold separately via such English auctions, I construct an equilibrium such
that bidders signal via jump bids, thereby forming rational expectations of the prices
without relying on any central mediator. This equilibrium eliminates the exposure
problem for a bidder whose valuation function is superadditive. Consequently, the
auction game overly concentrates the goods to a multi-item bidder and never overly
diﬀuses them to single-item bidders.
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11 Introduction
In decentralized markets, an economic agent hoping to acquire a bundle of goods often runs
into the following dilemma. One of the goods is available at a price above its standalone
value. Should he buy it or not? The problem is that the prices of the other items in the
bundle are uncertain and may be so high that the total price of the bundle exceeds its
total value. Without a “Walras auctioneer” to coordinate across markets, the agent cannot
postpone his decision on one good to wait for the realization of the prices for its complements.
This dilemma has been crystallized into the exposure problem in auction theory. Mil-
grom (2000) and Bykowsky et al. (2000) have constructed complete-information examples for
this problem. A few authors have analyzed the exposure problem in asymmetric-information
models. The typical setup is that two objects are being auctioned oﬀ via two separate auc-
tions simultaneously. Some bidders are local in the sense that they value only one particular
object. The others are global in the sense that they value both objects as complements.
A global bidder faces the exposure problem. Albano et al. (2001, 2006) analyze two vari-
ants of a two-object ascending auction. Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) and Rosenthal and
Wang (1996) consider simultaneous sealed-bid auctions for possibly more than two objects.
The qualitative predictions are typically that various kinds of ineﬃciency may occur. Some-
times the objects are overconcentrated to a single bidder while eﬃciency requires that they
go to diﬀerent bidders, and sometimes the goods may be overdiﬀused to separate owners
while eﬃciency requires that a single bidder should own them.1
This paper analyzes the exposure problem by proposing a new model of English auc-
tions to capture their open ascending nature. The idea is that the open transparent nature
of English auctions allows the bidders to signal to one another across auctions, thereby
forming a rational expectation of the prices. A bidder makes his signal credible via jump
bidding, i.e., committing to paying for the good at a pledged price (above its current price)
if he wins immediately.2 Based on this model, a continuation equilibrium is constructed
that eliminates the exposure problem conditional on any event that the problem may arise
(Proposition 2). Given this equilibrium, the exposure problem is eliminated and there is a
1 The exposure problem may arise in circumstances other than complementarity. For example, a bidder
with unit-demand preference may face the exposure problem when he is bidding for multiple homogeneous
units simultaneously. The exposure problem may even be driven by a bidder’s budget constraint, as in the
centralized two-object auction considered by Brusco and Lopomo (2005a).
2 The literature on jump bidding typically assumes that jump bidding occurs only at an exogenous stage.
See for example Avery (1998) and Gunderson and Wang (1998). Recently, Xiong (2007) ﬁnds in a single-unit
model a strict incentive for bidders to make a jump bid whose magnitude is a priori determined. In my paper,
the timing of jump bidding is endogenous, and the magnitude of a jump bid varies with the bidder’s type
and furthermore almost surely fully reveals the type.
2clear-cut qualitative “overconcentration” prediction of the auctions (Proposition 3).3
Although sensitive to the two-object assumption, this result conveys the message that,
even without central coordination, economic agents may get to form rational expectations
of prices through signaling to one another.
2 The Primitives
There are two items for sale, A and B, and several bidders. For each bidder i, the values
of winning item A alone, item B alone, and both items are, respectively, ui(A), ui(B), and
ui(AB). There are three kinds of bidders: one global bidder, named bidder γ, who values
items A and B as complements, several A-local bidders who value only item A, and several
B-local bidders who value only item B; a local bidder means an A- or B-local bidder. I.e.,
uγ(AB) ≥ uγ(A) + uγ(B), (1)
ui(AB) − ui(A) = ui(B) = 0 if i is A-local,
ui(AB) − ui(B) = ui(A) = 0 if i is B-local.
For each bidder i, it is commonly known whether i is global, A-local, or B-local, but
the standalone values ui(A) and ui(B), as well as the synergy ui(AB) − ui(A) − ui(B) if i
is the global bidder γ, are only privately known to i and are independently drawn from
distributions Fiα, Fiβ, and (if i = γ) Fγ. These distributions are commonly known and their
supports each have zero as the inﬁmum, with Fγ(0) = 0.
A bidder’s payoﬀ is equal to his value of the package he wins minus his total monetary
payment. He is risk neutral in his payoﬀ.
The two items are auctioned oﬀ via separate English auctions that start simultaneously.
To be eligible for an item, a bidder needs to participate in its auction from the start. Once
he drops out from the auction of an item, a bidder cannot raise his bid for it any more. Once
sold, the good is not refundable. Bidders’ actions are commonly observed.
This setup is decentralized in the sense that the auctioneers of the two auctions cannot
coordinate with each other on when to close the auctions.
Thus, when the global bidder can acquire an item say A, he may be still uncertain
about the price of the other item B. When the price for A is higher than its standalone
value, the bidder faces an exposure problem: if he drops out from A now, he foregoes the
probable opportunity of acquiring both items at a proﬁtable total price; if he buys A now,
however, the eventual price for B may turn out to be unproﬁtably high.
3The open transparent nature of English auctions may also facilitate tacit collusion among bidders. For
example see Brusco and Lopomo (2002, 2005b) and Garratt et al. (2007).
33 The Exposure Problem under the Clock Model
Let us illustrate the exposure problem when an English auction is modeled by the traditional
“clock model”: For each item k, the price pk starts at zero and rises continuously at an
exogenous positive speed until all but one bidder have quit bidding for k, at which point
item k is immediately sold to the remaining bidder at the current price.4
Let pA and pB denote the current prices for items A and B, respectively. For any x ∈ R,
let (x)+ := max{x,0}. Let EX[f((X) | g(X) ≥ 0] denote the expected value of the function
f(X) of the random variable X conditional on g(X) ≥ 0.
An undominated strategy for every local bidder is to continue bidding for his desired
item until its price reaches its value. It will be demonstrated that the following strategy for
the global bidder γ is a best reply to the undominated strategy.
a. When pA = pB = 0, participate in both auctions.
b. If neither item has been sold:
i. If vγ(A,pB) > pA and vγ(B,pA) > pB, where vγ(A,pB) and vγ(B,pA) will be
deﬁned later, then continue in both auctions.
ii. If vγ(A,pB) ≤ pA or vγ(B,pA) ≤ pB:
I. If uγ(k) ≤ pk for each item k ∈ {A,B}, then drop out from both auctions.
II. If uγ(k) > pk for some item k, then continue bidding for the item k∗ that
maximizes E(ui(k))i6=γ[(uγ(k) − maxi6=γ ui(k))+ | maxi6=γ ui(k) ≥ pk] over k ∈
{A,B} and drop out from the other item.
c. If the bidder has dropped out from an item k, then continue in the auction for the
other item, say −k, if and only if p−k < uγ(−k).
d. If the bidder has won an item k, then continue in the auction for the item −k if and
only if uγ(AB) − uγ(k) > p−k.
The strategy described above exhausts all possibilities. It will be well-deﬁned if vγ(A,pB)
and vγ(B,pA) are deﬁned. To deﬁne vγ(A,pB), consider the case where global bidder γ has
bought item A at price pA. Then, given any price ˜ pB for item B, the bidder’s payoﬀ will be
uγ(AB)−pA− ˜ pB if he also wins B and uγ(A)−pA if he loses B. Thus, having bought A, the
bidder’s optimal action is to continue in the auction for B if and only if uγ(AB)−uγ(A) > ˜ pB.
4 The model considered in this section is similar to one of the models in Albano at al. (2001, 2006). But
I do not need the two assumptions in their papers: (i) uγ(A) = uγ(B) and uγ −uγ(A)−uγ(B) is commonly
known; (ii) the prices of the two objects rise in the same pace (which they say in Albano at al., 2006, is
restrictive).
4(This explains provision (d) in the above strategy.) It follows that, if bidder γ buys A at
price pA and if the eventual price for B is ˜ pB, then his ex post payoﬀ is equal to
(uγ(AB) − uγ(A) − ˜ pB)
+ + uγ(A) − pA.
With item A sold to bidder γ, any other bidder j will continue bidding for B up to the
standalone value uj(B), hence
˜ pB = u−γ(B) := max
j6=i
uj(B).
Thus, if bidder γ buys A at price pA, the expected payoﬀ is equal to
Eu−γ(B)

(uγ(AB) − uγ(A) − u−γ(B))
+ | u−γ(B) ≥ pB

+ uγ(A) − pA.
Hence bidder γ’s expected payoﬀ from buying item A at price pA is positive if and only if
Eu−γ(B)

(uγ(AB) − uγ(A) − u−γ(B))
+ | u−γ(B) ≥ pB





(uγ(AB) − uγ(A) − u−γ(B))






(uγ(AB) − uγ(B) − u−γ(A))
+ | u−γ(A) ≥ pA

+ uγ(B). (3)
Proposition 1 Assume that the distributions Fiα and Fiβ are atomless for all bidders i.
The global bidder’s strategy (a)–(d), together with the local bidders’ undominated strategy of
bidding for the valued item up to its value, constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium when
each English auction is a clock auction.
Proof By the atomless assumption in this proposition and Eqs. (2)–(3), vγ(A,pB) is con-
tinuous in pB, and vγ(B,pA) is continuous in pA.
The justiﬁcation for provisions (a), (c), and (d) in the strategy are obvious. Let us
consider the case for provision (b), when neither item has been sold.
First, consider subcase (b.i), where vγ(A,pB) > pA and vγ(B,pA) > pB. By the conti-
nuity of vγ(A,·) and vγ(B,·), these strict inequalities will continue to hold for a suﬃciently
short interval of time. Thus, if the bidder is to continue bidding for A, his expected pay-
oﬀ from staying for item B is positive for at least a while, and the same statement is true
when A and B switch roles. This expected payoﬀ is bigger than the expected payoﬀ from
staying for only a single item, since vγ(k,p−k) > uγ(k) (∀k ∈ {A,B}) by (2)–(3). Hence it
5is suboptimal to drop out from one auction now while continuing in the other auction. It is
also suboptimal to drop out from both auctions, which yields zero payoﬀ.
Second, consider subcase (b.ii). Without loss, suppose vγ(A,pB) ≤ pA. Since vγ(A,pB)




B from now on. Thus, by the construction of vγ(A,·) and vγ(B,·), it is suboptimal to
continue bidding for both items. That, however, does not mean the bidder should quit both
auctions, because the standalone value of an item may still be above its current price. Hence
the justiﬁcation for provisions b.ii.I and b.ii.II are obvious.
The next remark says that the above equilibrium exhibits at least two kinds of inef-
ﬁciency. One is overdiﬀusion: the two items go to two separate bidders, while uγ(AB) >
maxj uj(A) + maxk uk(B). The second kind is overconcentration: for some distinct local
bidders i and j, bidder γ wins both items while uγ(AB) < ui(A) + uj(B).
Remark 1 If for all bidders i, distributions Fiα and Fiβ have no gap, then at the equilib-
rium constructed above, overdiﬀusion and overconcentration are events with strictly positive
probability.
The proof is in Appendix A. The intuition is: As long as both auctions are still going on after
the price of an item has reached its standalone value for a global bidder, the bidder will drop
out before the total price of the two items reach their combined value. Hence he “underbids”
before winning any item. If he has won an item, however, with the payment for that item
sunk, the bidder will bid for the other item up to its marginal value, which is greater than the
total value minus his payment for the won item. Hence the bidder “overbids” after winning
an item. Hence both overdiﬀusion and overconcentration are probable.
4 The Need for an Alternative Model to Capture the
Dynamics of English Auctions
The clock model, albeit widely used in auction theory, has abstracted away most of the
dynamic aspects of English auctions. In actual English auctions, bids may be submitted
through open outcries, hence a bidder may be able to speed up the rising price through
jump-bids and adjust his strategy during the intermission between outcries.
These dynamic aspects of English auctions are important for the presence of the ex-
posure problem. Recall that a bidder faces the exposure problem when he is about to buy
an item at its current price without knowing the eventual price for its complement. If prices
ascend through open outcries, however, the bidder may be able to partially resolve his un-
certainty by making a jump-bid. From the rivals’ responses, he could at least partially infer
6the price of the complement. That information might help the bidder to adjust his actions
before he has to commit to buying the ﬁrst item.
5 An Alternative Model
For each item, the auction is the clock model with the following amendments.
A1. As in the clock model, each active bidder, who has not dropped out from the
auction, can continue bidding by pressing the button for the item.
A2. Besides “continue,” an active bidder has the option of jump bidding: making a
bid higher than the item’s current price. This action is done in zero second.
A3. An active bidder can drop out from, or brieﬂy quit, and auction. That is done by
either releasing the button (if the price is ascending through the clock) or crying out “quit”
(if the price clock is pausing due to the following amendment).
A4. If a bidder drops out from an auction, the price clock in the auction pauses at
the dropout price for a short interval of time, called a pause. The maximum duration of the
pause is assumed to be exogenously δ seconds.
a1. During the pause, every bidder still active in the auction has three alternative actions:
quitting, staying in the auction, or resuming the auction (by crying out “resume”).
a2. If the pause has lasted for δ seconds and there is at least one active bidder in the
auction, the price clock resumes at the paused level unless there is only one active
bidder, in which case the item is immediately sold to this bidder at the paused price.
a3. During the pause, if an active bidder resumes the auction, then the price clock resumes
immediately without ﬁnishing the δ seconds, and if this bidder is the only active bidder
in the auction, the item is immediately sold to this bidder at the paused price.
a4. If every active bidder drops out during the pause, the pause ends without ﬁnishing the
δ seconds, and the item is sold according to the tie-breaking rule A6 described below.
A5. If a bidder jump-bids in an auction, the price clock in the auction jumps to the
jump bid instantly and then pauses at the jump bid. The maximum duration of the pause
is δ seconds.5
5 The duration of the pause triggered by a jump bid is assumed to be exogenous just for simplicity.
Our results can be extended to allow the following case of endogenous duration of a pause. The maximum
duration of the pause is equal to the time it takes for the price clock to reach the jump bid level had there not
been the jump bid; i.e, say the price of item k jumps by ∆k and the speed for the price clock is ˙ pk, then the
duration of the pause is equal to ∆k/˙ pk. The endogeneity of the duration of a pause prevents bidders from
slowing down an auction by submitting smaller and smaller “jump” bids, though bidders have no incentive
to do that in the equilibrium constructed here.
7a1. During the pause, every bidder still active in the auction has three alternative actions:
staying, making a higher jump bid, or quitting unless the bidder is the highest jump-
bidder, who has made a jump bid which is highest among all jump bids.
a2. If all but the highest jump-bidder have quit during the pause, the auction ends without
ﬁnishing the δ seconds and the highest jump-bidder buys the good at his jump bid.
a3. All jump bids are commonly observed even if they are submitted simultaneously.
a4. If there are multiple active bidders at the end of the pause, the price clock resumes
from the highest jump bid.
A6. A tie occurs if a bidder drops out from an auction and all the other currently active
bidders drop out from the auction either at the same instant or during the pause triggered
by the dropout action. The rule to break such ties is:
a1. Each bidder involved in a tie chooses whether to concede.
a2. If not all bidders concede, then the object is randomly assigned to those who do not
concede with equal probabilities and the selected one buys the good at its current price.
a3. If all bidders concede, then one of them is selected randomly with equal probabilities
and the selected one buys the good at its current price.
6 Avoiding Exposure via Jump Bidding
A decisive event means: (i) in one of the auctions, all the remaining active local bidders
have just dropped out, (ii) at least one local bidder is still active in the other auction, and
(iii) the global bidder is still active in both auctions. When a decisive event occurs we will
say that the auction is in a paused phase if it is the one where all the remaining active local
bidders have just dropped out, as its price clock pauses according to amendment A4. If an
auction is not in a paused phase and has not ended, we will say it is in an active phase.
Proposition 2 Assume that no local bidder bids for an item above its standalone value.
Conditional on any decisive event up to which the current posterior distributions of all bid-
ders’ types are commonly known, there exists a continuation equilibrium such that the fol-
lowing event occurs almost surely: the global bidder knows whether he can proﬁtably acquire
both items before he buys any item.
The idea is that the global bidder can, before making a purchase commitment in the
paused auction, ﬁnd out the eventual total price for the two items by making a jump bid in
8the active auction. Like an equilibrium bid in a ﬁrst-price auction, the bidder’s jump bid
reveals his type, i.e., his maximum willingness to pay in the active auction given that he
is to win the paused auction at the paused price. Seeing the jump bid, those local bidders
whose types are lower than the global bidder’s immediately quit, and those with higher types
immediately respond with jump bids. They prefer to signal their types through jump bids
because the global bidder’s maximum willingness to pay in the active auction would jump if
he has made a purchase commitment in the paused auction. If all local bidders immediately
quit, the global bidder wins at a price equal to his jump bid. Else he learns that the price in
the active auction will be too high for him to acquire both items proﬁtably, so he immediately
stops bidding for both items. In this case, if he wants, the global bidder can drop out from
the paused auction and, during tie-breaking, concede the good to the local bidder whose
dropout triggered the pause. Hence the global bidder suﬀers no exposure problem.
6.1 The Interim Types and Jump Bids during the Pause
Consider a decisive event. Without loss of generality, let the paused auction be the auction of
item A (brieﬂy auction A), with the price paused at pA. Let us calculate the global bidder γ’s
valuation of winning in the other auction, the auction for item B (brieﬂy auction B), during
the pause of auction A. The proofs of the lemmas in this subsection are in Appendix B.
If uγ(A) ≥ pA, bidder γ’s decision is straightforward. He would immediately resume
auction A, thereby ending the pause and buying item A. Having bought A, bidder γ’s
valuation of winning B becomes uγ(AB)−uγ(A), which will be his dropout price in auction B.
The case of uγ(A) < pA is more complicated, which includes the following two subcases:
If uγ(B) ≥ uγ(AB) − pA, bidder γ’s optimal action is to bid for item B alone:
Lemma 1 If uγ(B) ≥ uγ(AB) − pA, then global bidder γ prefers buying item B alone to
buying both items or buying A alone.
If uγ(B) < uγ(AB) − pA, bidder γ wants to acquire both items up to a certain point:
Lemma 2 If uγ(B) < uγ(AB)−pA and uγ(A) < pA, then it is dominated for global bidder γ
to buy item B alone and, during the pause, it is proﬁtable for him to buy item B if and only
if it is proﬁtable for him to buy both items, i.e., if and only if uγ(AB) − pA > pB.
Thus, the only nontrivial case for bidder γ during the pause of auction A is “uγ(B) <
uγ(AB) − pA and uγ(A) < pA.” In this case, the global bidder’s maximum willingness to
pay for item B during the pause, by Lemma 2, is equal to
tγ := uγ(AB) − pA. (4)
9Also denote
ti := ui(B) ∀i 6= γ. (5)
Call ti the interim type of bidder i for any i still active during the pause of auction A.6
For every bidder i active at the start of the pause, initialize Gi to be the distribution
function of ti, derived from Fiα, Fiβ and Fγ, conditional on the history of the game up to
the start of the pause. Let Ti denote the support of Gi. Let G−i := (Gj)j6=i. Let
t
(1)
−i := max{tj : j 6= i},
and let T
(1)
−i denote the support of the random variable whose realizations are denoted by t
(1)
−i.













i.e., the expected value of the highest rival’s interim type conditional on its not exceeding





ti ∈ Ti : βi,G−i(ti) = xi
	
.





i,G−i(xi) 6= ∅, then for any j 6= i and almost every tj (relative to Gj),
tj ≤ inf β
−1
i,G−i(xi) or tj > supβ
−1
i,G−i(xi). (7)
6.2 The Proposed Jump-Bidding Equilibrium
Here is a continuation equilibrium starting from the beginning of the pause of auction A at
the paused price pA.
1. If (global) bidder γ drops out from auction A during the pause, the local bidder i whose
dropout triggered the pause does not concede item A to γ.
2. The strategy of bidder γ is:
a. if uγ(A) ≥ pA,
i. immediately resume auction A, thereby buying A and ending the pause,
ii. and bid for item B if and only if the price pB of B is below uγ(AB) − uγ(A);
6 Although global bidder γ’s private information has three dimensions, uγ(A), uγ(B), and uγ(AB), his
behavior is tractable because, given one auction pausing and the other auction expected to ﬁnish within the
pause, his private information is reduced to only one dimension, uγ(AB) − pA.
10b. if uγ(B) ≥ uγ(AB) − pA and uγ(A) < pA,
i. drop out from auction A immediately,
ii. concede A to the local bidder(s) whose dropout triggered the pause,
iii. continue in auction B as long as uγ(B) > pB;
c. if uγ(B) < uγ(AB) − pA and uγ(A) < pA,
i. immediately submit a jump bid equal to βγ,G−γ(tγ) for item B,
ii. if bidder γ has submitted a jump bid xγ, then during the pause of auction B
triggered by the jump bid,
A. if a local bidder i drops out or does not respond with a jump bid xi such
that supβ
−1
i,G−i(xi) > inf β
−1
γ,G−γ(xγ), the posterior distribution Gi of ti is
updated by ti ≤ inf β
−1
γ,G−γ(xγ),
B. if every local bidder i either drops out or does not respond with a jump
bid xi such that supβ
−1
i,G−i(xi) > inf β
−1
γ,G−γ(xγ), and if xγ = βγ,G−γ(tγ),
then bidder γ immediately takes actions 2.a.i and 2.a.ii,
C. if a local bidder i submits a jump bid xi such that inf β
−1
i,G−i(xi) ≥ tγ,
then bidder γ immediately drops out of auction B and takes actions 2.b.i
and 2.b.ii,
D. if some local bidder i jump-bids but there is no jump bid xi from any
local bidder i such that tγ ≤ inf β
−1
i,G−i(xi), then bidder γ plays strategy b
in the equilibrium constructed in §3.
3. The strategy of any active local bidder i (i 6= γ) is:
a. unless bidder γ has made a jump bid, stay in auction B without jump-bidding
and quit at pB = ui(B),
b. if bidder γ has made a jump bid xγ during the pause of auction A,
i. if ti ≤ inf β
−1
γ,G−γ(xγ), drop out immediately,
ii. else immediately make a jump bid equal to βi,G−i(ti), with G−i being the
posterior distributions updated by bidder γ’s jump bid,
A. if ti ≤ inf β
−1
j,G−j(xj) given the jump bid xj from some local bidder j 6= i,
drop out immediately unless ti = β
−1
j,G−j(xj) = maxk β
−1
k,G−k(xk), in which
case i drops out if and only if i < j (so that not all local bidders quit),
B. else stay in auction B without jump-bidding and quit at pB = ui(B).
116.3 The Proof of Proposition 2
On the path of the proposed equilibrium, global bider γ almost surely resolves his price
uncertainty. To show that, recall Lemma 3. It implies that, from bidder γ’s jump bid
βγ,G−γ(tγ), every local bidder i almost surely can tell (i) tγ ≥ ti apart from (ii) tγ < ti. In
case (i), bidder i immediately drops out. In case (ii), bidder i immediately makes a jump
bid βi,G−i(ti) based on the updated posteriors G−i.
If all local bidders belong to case (i), bidder γ wins item B at the known price βγ,G−γ(tγ)
before the pause of auction A ends. Since βγ,G−γ(tγ) ≤ tγ by deﬁnition of the jump bid, the
bidder knows, by deﬁnition of tγ, Eq. (4), that it is proﬁtable for him to buy both items.
If some local bidder i belongs to case (ii), upon seeing i’s jump bid, bidder γ knows
that almost surely tγ < ti ≤ t
(1)
−γ and hence the price for B will be greater than tγ if bidder γ
does not drop out (contingent plan 3.b.ii.B). I.e., bidder γ knows that it is almost surely
unproﬁtable for him to buy both items. Again he learns that during the pause of auction A.
(Aside: The contingency in plan 2.c.ii.D is a zero-probability event if bidder γ’s jump bid
was equal to the proposed βγ,G−γ(tγ).)
We still need to verify every bidder’s incentive to follow the proposed equilibrium.
6.3.1 The Incentive for Contingent Plans 1, 2.a, and 2.b
Plan 1 follows from the fact that each local bidder’s proﬁt from buying item A is nonnegative,
as his dropout price does not exceed his standalone value of the item, according to the
assumption of the proposition.
Contingent plan 2.a has been justiﬁed by the second paragraph of §6.1.
Contingent plan 2.b follows from Lemma 1, which implies that bidder γ would take
actions 2.b.i and 2.b.ii, quitting from auction A and conceding A to the local bidders. Since
the local bidders do not concede (plan 1), bidder γ frees himself from any obligation of
buying A. With only item B to consider, the optimality of plan 2.b.iii is obvious.
6.3.2 The Global Bidder’s Incentive for Contingent Plan 2.c
Under the contingency of plan 2.c, uγ(B) ≥ uγ(AB) − pA and uγ(A) < pA, so Lemma 2
applies. Then by the deﬁnition of tγ, Eq. (4), bidder γ buys both items if he knows that the
price pB of item B is less than or equal to his interim type tγ, and he buys neither item if
he knows that pB is greater than tγ.
Contingent plan 2.c.ii.B is optimal, because the updating rule 2.c.ii.A coupled with
bidder γ’s obedience to the jump bid function (xγ = βγ,G−γ(tγ)) implies that tγ ≥ t
(1)
−γ ≥ pB.
Hence bidder γ buys both items by taking actions 2.a.i and 2.a.ii according to plan 2.c.ii.B.
12Contingent plan 2.c.ii.C is optimal because the contingency inf β
−1
i,G−i(xi) ≥ tγ under
this plan, coupled with bidder γ’s expectation that other players abide to the jump bidding
function, implies that tγ ≤ t
(1)
−γ. Then pB will be greater than or equal to tγ if bidder γ does
not drop out (contingent plan 3.b.ii.B). Hence it is optimal for bidder γ to drop out of both
auctions by following plan 2.c.ii.C.
Claim: Under the contingency of plan 2.c, bidder γ prefers making a jump bid to
not doing so. If he does not jump bid, the continuation play is the equilibrium presented
in §3, as the local bidders will stay without jump bidding until the price reaches their values
(plan 3.a). Then bidder γ will follow strategy b in that equilibrium. His expected payment
upon winning in this continuation equilibrium is the same as the one if he jump-bids, because
in both cases, pA has been ﬁxed, and the price for item B will be equal to t
(1)
−i in expectation.
The events in which bidder γ wins are diﬀerent in the two cases. If bidder γ makes a jump bid
equal to βγ,G−γ(tγ), the event where he wins is exactly the event where his proﬁt is positive
conditional on winning. In contrast, if the global bidder does not jump-bid and hence follows
the equilibrium in §3, the event where he wins is not aligned with the event where his proﬁt
is positive conditional on winning, because overdiﬀusion and overconcentration are both
probable. Thus, bidder γ would rather jump-bid according to the proposed equilibrium.
Lemma 4 If bidder γ is to make a jump bid, his optimal jump bid is equal to βγ,G−γ(tγ).
Proof First observe, by deﬁnition of interim types, tγ − pB = uγ(AB) − pA − pB is equal
to bidder γ’s payoﬀ if he wins in auction B at price pB during the pause of auction A.
Second, observe that making a jump bid is equivalent to the action of picking a point
ˆ tγ ∈ Tγ and announcing:
My interim type is equal to ˆ tγ such that ˆ tγ = inf{t0
γ ∈ Tγ : βγ,G−γ(t0
γ) =
βγ,G−γ(ˆ tγ)}, hence my payment is equal to βi,G−i(ˆ tγ) if I win immediately.
The lemma is proved if it is optimal for bidder γ to pick ˆ tγ = tγ.
Suppose ˆ tγ < tγ. If t
(1)
−γ ≤ ˆ tγ, bidder γ wins immediately (contingent plan 3.b.i); if
t
(1)
−γ > ˆ tγ, bidder γ cannot win immediately, and given local bidders’ response 3.b.ii.B if γ
does not quit, the best he can hope for is that he wins if and only if t
(1)
−γ ≤ tγ and he pays t
(1)
−γ
upon winning. (He cannot do better than that if the price uncertainty is not resolved within
the pause of auction A.) Thus, in picking ˆ tγ < tγ, the expected payoﬀ for bidder γ is less
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which is equal to bidder γ’s expected payoﬀ from picking ˆ tγ = tγ.
Suppose ˆ tγ ≥ tγ. Then bidder γ wins if and only if t
(1)
−γ ≤ ˆ tγ. That is because if
t
(1)
−γ ≤ ˆ tγ, he wins immediately (contingent plan 3.b.i); if t
(1)
−γ > ˆ tγ, even if bidder γ does not
drop out, the price for item B will be t
(1)
−γ (contingent plan 3.b.ii.B), which is greater than
ˆ tγ ≥ tγ. Since βγ,G−γ is weakly increasing, bidder γ’s winning probability








is weakly increasing in his announced type ˆ tγ. Furthermore, when he announces ˆ tγ, bidder γ’s
expected payment is equal to his winning probability times his jump bid, i.e.,






















= ˆ tγqγ(ˆ tγ) −
Z ˆ tγ
0
qγ(s)ds integration by parts.
Thus, the payment scheme induced by the jump-bidding strategy satisﬁes the envelope for-
mula for all alleged interim types ˆ tγ ≥ tγ.
It follows that it is optimal for bidder 1 to reveal his interim type tγ truthfully by
submit the jump bid βγ,G−γ(tγ).
Thus, we have shown bidder γ’s incentive to follow strategy 2.c.
6.3.3 A Local Bidder’s Incentive for Contingent Plan 3
The optimality of plan 3.a is obvious, since the global bidder does not jump bid. Ac-
tion 3.b.ii.B is dominant. Action 3.b.ii.A is a best reply because bidder i has learned that
some other local bidder j 6= i has a higher value than he does. With local bidder j following
contingent plan 3.b.ii.B, the price for item B will be higher than the value for i.
14Let us verify the incentive to follow the jump-bidding strategy 3.b.ii. Consider the
contingency under 3.b.ii, i.e., bidder γ has made a jump bid xγ.
Claim 1: Conditional on not dropping out, a local bidder i prefers making a jump
bid that signals ti > inf β
−1
γ,G−γ(xγ) to not doing so. Expecting the global bidder to buy
item A immediately if no local bidder responds with a jump bid that signals the above event
(contingent plan 2.c.ii.B), if bidder i does not make a jump bid in this manner, there is a
positive probability with which the global bidder buys A immediately, thereby raising the
global bidder’s valuation of item B from uγ(AB)−pA to uγ(AB)−uγ(A) (since uγ(A) < pA)
and hence reducing bidder i’s winning probability, which by the envelope formula, reduces i’s
expected payoﬀ. Thus, bidder i prefers to submit a jump bid that signals ti > inf β
−1
γ,G−γ(xγ).
Claim 2: If bidder γ’s jump bid reveals to local bidder i that ti > inf β
−1
γ,G−γ(xγ), then
local bidder i does not want to drop out. That is because there is a positive probability with
which i wins with positive proﬁts.
Claim 3: If a local bidder i will respond with a jump bid in the contingency under
plan 3.b.ii, it is optimal for i to represent his type ti truthfully in the jump bid, i.e., to make
a jump bid equal to βi,G−i(ti) given the updated posterior G−i. The proof is the same as




−i, qγ → qi, and G−γ → G−i.
We now show that the jump-bidding strategy 3.b.ii is a best reply for any local bidder i.
Under the contingency of 3.b.ii, ti > inf β
(1)
γ,G−γ(xγ), so Claim 2 says that bidder i does not
drop out immediately, Claim 1 implies that he would make a jump bid to signal the event
“ti > inf β
(1)
γ,G−γ(xγ),” and Claim 3 implies that his jump bid signals his type truthfully.
Finally, contingent plan 3.b.i is a best reply for any local bidder i, because under the
contingency of 3.b.i, bidder γ’s jump bid xγ has revealed to i that ti ≤ inf β
−1
γ,G−γ(xγ). If
bidder i does not drop out immediately, Claim 1 implies that bidder i would make a jump
bid to signal “ti > inf β
−1
−1,G−γ(xγ).” But this signal is not truthful, so it is suboptimal for the
bidder according to Claim 3. It follows that it is optimal for bidder i to drop out immediately
as recommended by 3.b.i.
7 Overconcentration
If the continuation equilibrium in Proposition 2 is expected, the global bidder in the simul-
taneous auctions can bid for both items without the risk of negative proﬁts, and he has no
price uncertainty when buying any item. That eﬀectively allows the global bidder to bid for
the package {A,B}. Analogous to the case in a single-object English auction with private
values, the next lemma follows. Its proof is in Appendix C.
Lemma 5 If the continuation equilibrium constructed in Proposition 2 is played once any
decisive event occurs, then in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the simultaneous-auction
15game and before any decisive event occurs,
i. if the global bidder γ loses both auctions simultaneously then almost surely
uγ(AB) ≤ max
i6=γ,j6=γ
{ui(A) + uj(B)}, (8)
ii. if γ loses the auction for item k ∈ {A,B} while he is continuing for the other item −k,
then almost surely
uγ(−k) ≥ uγ(AB) − max
i6=γ
ui(k). (9)
This lemma, coupled with Proposition 2, implies that the global bidder does not give up
bidding for an item until he knows for sure that his valuation of the item cannot exceed those
of his rivals. The local bidders, in contrast, may choose to stop bidding for an item, thereby
risking a positive probability of losing the item, even when there is a positive probability
with which his valuation is higher than the global bidder’s. For instance, when an A-local
bidder becomes the only one competing with the global bidder for item A while the auction
for item B is still going on, if the local bidder drops out at a price pA, he may still get to buy
item A at price pA because the B-local bidders may outbid the global bidder, who would
then concede item A to this A-local bidder. Hence a local bidder may free ride the others.7
While the local bidders cannot overcome the incentive constraint for them to cooperate fully
in their competition against the global bidder, the global bidder can overcome the exposure
problem due to the jump-bidding signals. That implies the overcentration prediction.
Proposition 3 Assume that the distributions of the bidders’ valuations are atomless and
that (8) does not almost surely hold according to the prior distributions. If the continuation
equilibrium constructed in Proposition 2 is played once any decisive event occurs, then in any
perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the simultaneous-auction game, overconcentration occurs with
a positive probability and overdiﬀusion occurs with zero probability.
Proof Consider any perfect Bayesian equilibrium speciﬁed by the hypothesis of the propo-
sition. Claim (i) of Lemma 5, coupled with Proposition 2, implies that overdiﬀusion occurs
with zero probability at this equilibrium.
To establish the overconcentration claim, consider the following event, denoted by EA:
At some current prices, global bidder γ is active for both items, some bidder α is
the only active bidder for item A (the other A-local bidders either have dropped
out a while ago or have just dropped out with bidder α deciding whether to drop
out immediately), and for some m = 1,2,..., bidders i1,...,im are the B-local
bidders active for item B.
7 This is the threshold problem typically attached to package auctions.
16Analogously, let EB denote the event such that items A and B switch roles (hence the A-local
bidder α is replaced by a B-local bidder β).
The event EA ∪ EB occurs with strictly positive probability. Otherwise, the global
bidder would have zero probability of winning both items. Then Claim (i) of Lemma 5
implies that (8) holds almost surely according to prior distributions, which is impossible by
the hypothesis of the proposition.
Therefore, to prove the overconcentration claim, it suﬃces to prove that, conditional on
event EA (resp., EB), there is a positive probability with which bidder α (resp., β) drops out
at a price below uα(A) (resp., uβ(B)). Let us see why that suﬃces. By symmetry, consider
only the case of EA. If bidder α drops out at a price pA < uα(A), then a decisive event
occurs and by the continuation equilibrium in Proposition 2, the two items are allocated
eﬃciently except that the dropout price pA is taken as bidder α’s valuation of A, hence
overconcentration occurs with strictly positive probability.
Thus, consider event EA and let uα(A) be the value of item A for the remaining A-local
bidder α. By the previous paragraph, the proof is complete if at the equilibrium there is a
positive measure of prices pA < uα(A) such that bidder α quits when the price of item A
reaches pA under event EA. Hence suppose that bidder α’s equilibrium strategy requires him
to stay active until the price reaches uα(A) as long as the auction of item B is still going on.
We shall prove a contradiction by showing that the bidder strictly prefers deviating from
such equilibrium strategy when the current price of item A is suﬃciently close to uα(A).
Suppose bidder α drops out at the current price pA, then a decisive event occurs and
in its continuation equilibrium, global bidder γ eventually loses item A if and only if one of
the following two events occurs:
pA > uγ(A) and pA + maxk=1,...,m uik(B) > uγ(AB) and uγ(B) < uγ(AB) − pA, (10)
or pA > uγ(A) and uγ(B) > uγ(AB) − pA. (11)
(Condition (10) corresponds to the event that bidder γ loses both items in the jump-bidding
equilibrium, and (11) the event that γ loses item A because winning both items is worse-oﬀ
than winning only B.) Upon winning item A, local bidder α pays pA. Hence the expected
payoﬀ for bidder α to drop out now is equal to
(uα(A) − pA)Prob{A → α | (pA,pB)},
where Prob{A → α | (pA,pB)} is equal to a positive fraction (which is equal to one if no
other bidder has just dropped out from item A at the current price pA) of the probability of
max{uγ(A),uγ(AB) − maxk=1,...,m uik(B)} < pA < uγ(AB) − uγ(B)
or max{uγ(A),uγ(AB) − uγ(B)} < pA
17conditional on the current history. There is a positive-probability set of valuation functions
such that the conditional probability Prob{A → α | (uα(A),pB)} is a positive number. Thus,
for any pA < uα(A) suﬃciently close to uα(A), Prob{A → α | (pA,pB)} is bounded from
below by some M > 0, so the expected payoﬀ for bidder α to drop out at the current price pA
is bounded from below by
(uα(A) − pA)M = O(uα(A) − pA).
Compare this to the expected payoﬀ for bidder α if α follows the equilibrium strategy
of not dropping until the price of A reaches uα(A). For any tα ∈ [pA,uα(A)], consider the
event in which bidder α wins item A with a nonnegative payoﬀ if his true type is tα instead
of uα(A) and if he follows the equilibrium strategy. Bidder α achieves such an outcome only
if the global bidder γ drops out from the auction for A during the interval when its price
rises from the current pA to bidder α’s valuation tα. If bidder γ does so, γ quits either (i)
before or (ii) after a decisive event occurs.
In case (i), Lemma 5 implies that
uγ(AB) ≤ tα + max
k=1,...,m















In case (ii), since bidder α abides to the equilibrium strategy of not dropping out until
the price of item A reaches tα as long as auction B is still going on, the decisive event must
be triggered by the B-local bidders at some price p0
B of item B. Then by Proposition 2, with
the roles of A and B switched, bidder α’s winning event is
uγ(B) ≥ p0
B, uγ(AB) − uγ(B) ≤ tα, or
uγ(B) < p0
B, uγ(A) ≥ uγ(AB) − p0
B, uγ(A) ≤ tα, or
uγ(B) < p0
B, uγ(A) < uγ(AB) − p0
B, uγ(AB) ≤ p0
B + tα.
The ﬁrst line implies that tα ≥ uγ(AB)−uγ(B); the second and third lines each imply that
tα ≥ uγ(AB) − p0
B. This, coupled with the fact that p0
B ≤ maxk=1,...,m uik(B), implies that
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, (12)
where H(pA,pB) denotes the event that both auctions have been continuing up to the current
prices (pA,pB), with global bidder γ active in both auctions and local bidders i1,...,im active








otherwise bidder γ would have quit from auction A by now.
By the above calculation, qα(tα | pA) is the upper bound of the probability with which
bidder α wins item A by following the equilibrium, given uα(A) = tα, conditional on the







is independent of the equilibrium under consideration, with the prior distributions atomless,
the probability for this random variable to be bounded between pA and tα is in the order of
tα − pA. Thus,
qα(tα | pA) = O(tα − pA). (14)




qα(tα | pA)dtα = (uα(A)−pA)qα(τα | pA) ≤ (uα(A)−pA)O(uα(A)−pA) = o(uα(A)−pA).
for some τ between tα and pA. Thus, for any pA < uα(A) suﬃciently close to uα(A),
bidder α’s expected payoﬀ from following the equilibrium is less than his expected payoﬀ
from dropping out at the current price pA. Thus, local bidder α is better-oﬀ quitting slightly
before the price reaches his value. This contradiction proves the desired assertion.
8 Conclusion
Due to the open transparent nature of an English auction, it should not be surprising that the
simultaneous auctions analyzed above may admit multiple equilibria. An open question is
19whether there exists an equilibrium where the exposure problem is not eliminated or partially
mitigated. While addressing this question is beyond the scope of this paper, it can be noted
that the answer may vary with the ﬁne details of the model. For example, when the last
A-local bidder drops out, the global bidder may somehow expect that the remaining B-local
bidders would never jump bid, hence he would buy good A immediately without waiting
for their signals. In that case, the exposure problem is not mitigated at all. However, if we
slightly modify the model so that no one can buy the item in a paused auction until the
exogenous δ-second pause expires, then one can show that this exposure-prone equilibrium
cannot survive, because a remaining B-local bidder would then have time to signal through
jump bids.
The main point of this paper is not that the exposure problem can be mitigated if
the decentralized simultaneous auctions are modiﬁed to allow jump bidding. Rather, the
message is that if we build models that capture the dynamic details of English auctions, we
can construct new self-enforcing arrangements in which economic agents signal and forecast
prices without relying on any central coordination.
A The Proof of Remark 1
Without loss of generality, suppose there are only three distinct bidders, an A-local bidder α,
a B-local bidder β, and the global bidder γ. Suppose that
uα(A) > uγ(A) > 0, uβ(B) > uγ(B) > 0,
which is an event with positive probability because Fβ and Fα have no gap. In this event,
the eventual prices for A and B for bidder γ are respectively uα(A) and uβ(B) if γ does not
quit.
We claim that, within this event, overconcentration and overdiﬀusion are each possible
with strictly positive probability.
To prove that, pick (uγ(AB),uγ(A),uγ(B)) such that uγ(AB) − uγ(A) and uγ(AB) −
uγ(B) are interior points of the supports of Fβ and Fα, respectively. There is a positive
probability of such (uγ(AB),uγ(A),uγ(B)). By the choice of (uγ(AB),uγ(A),uγ(B)) and
the assumption that Fα and Fβ have no gap, we know that if 0 ≤ pB < uγ(AB)−uγ(A) and
0 ≤ pA < uγ(AB) − uγ(B),
0 < Euβ(B) [(uγ(AB) − uγ(A) − uβ(B))+ | uβ(B) ≥ pB] < uγ(AB) − uγ(A) − pB, (15)
0 < Euα(A) [(uγ(AB) − uγ(B) − uα(A))+ | uα(A) ≥ pA] < uγ(AB) − uγ(B) − pA. (16)
Overdiﬀusion: By Eqs. (2)–(3) and the second inequality of (15) and that of (16),
vγ(A,pB) < uγ(AB) − pB and vγ(B,pA) < uγ(AB) − pA if 0 ≤ pB < uγ(AB) − uγ(A) and
200 ≤ pA < uγ(AB) − uγ(B). It then follows from provision (b) of the equilibrium strategy
that, conditional on both auctions still going on, bidder γ will drop out from at least one
auction when the price trajectory reaches some (p∗
A,p∗
B), with uγ(AB) < p∗
A + p∗
B. Thus,
it is probable to have (uγ(AB),uα(A),uβ(B)) such that uγ(AB) > uα(A) + uβ(B) and
“vγ(A,uβ(B)) < uα(A) or vγ(B,uα(A)) < uβ(B),” i.e., overdiﬀusion.
Overconcentration: By Eq. (2) and the ﬁrst inequality of (15), vγ(A,pB) > uγ(A)
if 0 ≤ pB < uγ(AB) − uγ(A). Thus, p∗
A > uγ(A) for the aforementioned dropout price
for bidder i. By the no-gap assumption of Fα, there is a positive probability with which
p∗
A > uα(A) > uγ(A). Because p∗
A > uα(A), bidder γ wins item A. Consequently, he bids
for item B up to uγ(AB) − uγ(A). With a positive probability, uβ(B) < uγ(AB) − uγ(A)
(hence bidder γ also wins B) and uβ(B) > uγ(AB) − uα(A) (so it is more eﬃcient to award
the items separately to bidders α and β). Hence this is an overconcentration event.
B The Proofs of Lemmas 1–3
Lemma 1 Let pB denote the eventual price for item B. By uγ(B) ≥ uγ(AB) − pA,
uγ(B) − pB ≥ uγ(AB) − pA − pB. (17)
Then bidder γ would rather bid only for item B than bid for both items. Furthermore,
coupled with (1), Ineq. (17) implies that uγ(B) − pB ≥ uγ(A) + uγ(B) − pA − pB, hence
0 ≥ uγ(A) − pA, so bidder γ does not want to buy item A alone.
Lemma 2 By the hypothesis uγ(B) < uγ(AB) − pA,
uγ(B) − pB < uγ(AB) − pA − pB,
hence the payoﬀ from buying both items is greater than the payoﬀ from buying item B alone.
Also, it is unproﬁtable to buy A alone since uγ(A) < pA. Thus, during the pause, bidder γ
chooses between two goals: (i) to buy both items, which if realized would yield a payoﬀ
equal to uγ(AB)−pA−pB; (ii) to buy none, which if realized would yield zero payoﬀ. Thus,
during the pause, the valuation of winning item B is equal to the valuation of buying both
items, i.e., uγ(AB) − pA − pB, as asserted.
Lemma 3 By deﬁnition (6), the function βi,G−i is weakly increasing. Suppose it is not
strictly increasing, then for some ti,t0
i ∈ Ti with ti < t0














21Note ti ≥ inf Ti ≥ inf T
(1)
−i . For any x > ti,
Q
j6=i Gj(x) > 0. Thus,
∀x > ti ∀j 6= i Gj(x) > 0. (19)
Pick any k 6= i. If tk ∈ (ti,t0
i], then (19), applied to x = tk, implies that there is a positive
probability with which tk is the realized t
(1)
−i. Then (18) implies Prob{ti < tk ≤ t0
i} = 0,
hence (7).
C The Proof of Lemma 5
First, in any (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium of any single-unit English auction game with
private values, the allocation is ex post eﬃcient. That is because, when the current price
has exceeded a bidder’s valuation of the good, the unique best response for this bidder is to
drop out. Thus, if a bidder is to win the English auction, the price he pays does not exceed
the highest value of his rivals. Therefore, a bidder would avoid any action that results in
losing with a positive probability if his posterior belief still assigns a positive probability to
the event that his value is higher than his rivals’. With all actions commonly observed, his
posterior belief is the same as the (commonly known) equilibrium posterior belief. Thus, the
equilibrium probability for ineﬃcient allocation is zero.
Second, in our simultaneous auctions game, once the global bidder γ has lost at least
one of the two auctions, the allocation of any continuation equilibrium is ex post eﬃcient in
the sense that each item goes to a bidder whose standalone value of the good is the highest
among all the bidders remaining active for that item. This follows from the ﬁrst assertion
because, once the global bidder is no longer active in both auctions, each auction becomes
an independent single-unit English auction, with each active bidder’s private value being the
bidder’s standalone value.
Third, for any local bidder i who values only item k ∈ {A,B}, if the total current price
of all the items that he is bidding for has exceeded ui(k), then the unique best response
for i is to drop out from all the items that he is bidding for. (We allow the possibility for a
local bidder to bid for the item that he does not value.) Then, if the global bidder γ is to
win both items, the total price of the two items does not exceed the right-hand side of (8).
Thus, as in the ﬁrst assertion, as long as (8) does not almost surely hold, γ would not take
any action that with strictly positive probability results in losing both items simultaneously.
Therefore, claim (i) of the lemma holds.
To prove claim (ii), consider bidder γ’s options before any decisive event occurs. If he
loses in auction k ∈ {A,B} while continuing in the other auction −k, then it follows from
the second assertion that his expected payoﬀ is E[(uγ(k) − maxi6=γ ui(k))+]. If he continues
for both items until either (8) holds or a decisive event occurs, then by Proposition 2 and

















By Jensen’s inequality and the fact that max{x,y,z} is a convex function of (x,y,z), (20) is
greater than or equal to E[(uγ(k) − maxi6=γ ui(k))+] for each k ∈ {A,B}, and the inequality
is strict unless bidder γ knows that almost surely
uγ(k) − max
i6=γ





i.e., (9) holds almost surely, as asserted by claim (ii).
References
[1] Albano, G.L., Germano, F., Lovo, S., 2001. A comparison of standard multi-unit auc-
tions with synergies. Economics Letters. 71, 55–60.
[2] Albano, G.L., Germano, F., Lovo, S., 2006. Ascending auctions for multiple objects:
The case for the Japanese design. Economic Theory. 28, 331–355.
[3] Avery, C., 1998. Strategic jump bidding in English auctions. Review of Economic
Studies. 65, 185–210.
[4] Brusco, S., Lopomo, G., 2002. Collusion via signalling in simultaneous ascending bid
auctions with heterogeneous objects, with and without complementarities. Review of
Economic Studies. 69, 407–436.
[5] Brusco, S., Lopomo, G., 2005a. Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementari-
ties and known budget constraints. Mimeo, SUNY at Stony Brook and Fuqua School
of Business at Duke.
[6] Brusco, S., Lopomo, G., 2005b Simultaneous ascending bid auctions with privately
known budget constraints. Mimeo, SUNY at Stony Brook and Fuqua School of Business
at Duke.
[7] Bykowsky, M., Cull, R., Ledyard, J., 2000. Mutually destructive bidding: The FCC
auction design problem. Journal of Regulatory Economics. 17, 205–228.
[8] Garratt, R., Tr¨ oger, T., Zheng, C., 2007. Collusion via Resale. ISU Economics Working
Paper 07015, Department of Economics, Iowa State University.
23[9] Gunderson, A., Wang, R., 1998. Signaling by jump bidding in private values auctions.
Mimeo, Institute for Economic Research Working Paper 975, Queen’s University.
[10] Krishna, V., Rosenthal, R.W., 1996. Simultaneous auctions with synergies. Games and
Economic Behavior. 17, 1–31.
[11] Milgrom, P., 2000. Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending auction.
Journal of Political Economy. 108, 245–272.
[12] Rosenthal, R., Wang, R., 1996. Simultaneous auctions with synergies and common
values. Games and Economic Behavior. 17, 32–55.
[13] Xiong, S., 2007. Resolving the “revenue puzzle” for jump bidding in English auctions.


















E[· | ·], 4






























exposure problem, 2, 3
global bidder, 2, 3
highest jump-bidder, 8
interim type, 10
local bidder, 2, 3
overconcentration, 2, 6
overdiﬀusion, 2, 6
pause, 7
paused phase, 8
quit, 7
standalone values, 3
threshold problem, 16
tie, 8
25